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Abstract  
Countries that have totally different policy preferences tend to insist upon negotiation 
modalities convenient to themselves, without entering into substantial negotiations. 
This is what I refer to as the elevation of rivalry to the “meta-” level. Negotiations 
often become irreconcilable not because of fierce disagreement on substance but 
because of the elevation of disagreement to the meta-level. The purpose of this study is 
to depict the meta-level rivalry between countries that aspire to international 
leadership, using case studies of Sino-Japanese rivalry in regional cooperation, such as 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP), Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and Asian Monetary Fund 
(AMF). 
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1. Introduction 
 
Suppose that there are two countries that have entirely different policy preferences. 
The two countries may sit down and have constructive negotiations and agree to assume 
co-leadership, complementing each other’s strengths. There is, however, the possibility 
that each country ends up insisting upon negotiation modalities convenient to itself, 
without initiating substantial negotiations. This is what I refer to the elevation of rivalry 
to the “meta-” level. Negotiations often become irreconcilable not because of fierce 
disagreement on substance but because of the elevation of disagreement to the 
meta-level. The purpose of this study is to depict the meta-level rivalry between 
countries that aspire to international leadership.1 The analysis below will show how 
difficult it is to set negotiation modalities acceptable to concerned parties in 
competition.  
 
It is during the negotiation preparation stage when such an elevation of rivalry may 
happen. Once the negotiations on substance are launched, the game is nearly over; the 
negotiations over the negotiation modalities before the launch of negotiations on 
substance are the main battlefield for countries that aspire to leadership. The negotiation 
preparation stage starts with the formation of a group of countries that share the idea of 
establishing institutions and ends with the launch of substantial negotiations on 
institution building, to be followed by the actual negotiation stage. The “negotiation” 
during the negotiation preparation stage is intense and complex because negotiation 
modalities set during this period affect the entire course of negotiations. During the 
negotiation preparation stage, the modalities of the forthcoming negotiations on 
substance should be agreed upon or at least shared among the concerned parties. There 
are three meta-level factors that are important in shaping negotiations: membership 
(which countries can and cannot participate in negotiations), agenda (what can and 
cannot be discussed in the negotiations), and sponsorship (which country can claim 
credit as the “founder” and can hold the chairmanship at negotiation meetings). 
 
We will use the case study of Sino-Japanese relations in regional cooperation 
building to examine irreconcilable meta-level rivalry. The two countries certainly 
compete at the non-meta level, having entirely different ideas about regional 
cooperation, including free trade agreements (FTAs) and international financial 
institutions (IFIs). China emphasizes trade facilitation and, at most, trade liberalization. 
It does not like “deep” integration that requires regulatory reform of services and 
investment sectors. Hence, China prefers goods-centric FTAs and supports IFIs that 
finance infrastructure development beneficial to trade facilitation, such as transport 
infrastructure. China is not of the view that IFIs should assist in the development of the 
regulatory framework of the recipient country. Even if IFIs make a “profit” under the 
given regulatory standards, just like in the private sector, such is acceptable to China 
(note that regulatory standards, such as environmental standards, are sometimes absent). 
By contrast, Japan emphasizes the significance of regulatory reform in services trade 
and investment, rather than tariff reduction. It prefers comprehensive approaches to 
                                                   
1 Having a fundamental difference in policy preference (disagreement at the non-meta level) is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for meta-level rivalry. To identify the determinants that enhance the rivalry at the meta level is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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development (not just infrastructure development), including the establishment of 
regulatory standards (e.g., environmental standards) for partner countries. Hence, Japan 
supports service/investment-centric FTAs. It holds to the idea that IFIs should help 
develop environmental standards of recipient countries, not just lending money—it 
prefers a development bank. However, interestingly, the two countries seldom have 
substantial discussions about these substantial issues of regional cooperation in a quiet 
room; the real problem is that disagreement on substance is elevated to the meta level, 
resulting in a situation in which no constructive negotiation takes place.  
 
Note, however, that I do not argue that the meta-level rivalry of institutionalizing 
negotiation modalities is unique to China and Japan. It is undoubtedly a world-wide 
phenomenon. In fact, as we will see later, such a meta-level rivalry also exists between 
China/Japan and the United States. However, the negotiation process maneuver of 
achieving convenient negotiation modalities seems be to be more important to China 
and Japan, and perhaps other Asian countries, than it is to the West because Asians value 
the process of negotiations or institutionalization in addition to substance (Acharya 
1997). In particular, the sponsorship of negotiations, such as which country originally 
proposed the new institution, is highly critical to Asian countries in making a decision 
over whether or not to support a proposal. This is because many countries accept the 
norm that the founder’s voice should be respected.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of the 
analytical framework of empirical examinations, namely, the meta-level 
institutionalization of negotiation modalities. More specifically, I will explain the way 
in which the meta-level rivalry takes place with regard to the membership, agenda, and 
sponsorship of negotiations. Then, the irreconcilable rivalry between China and Japan in 
regional cooperation in the field of finance and trade will be discussed in turn. We will 
review the irreconcilable rivalry between China and Japan using specific cases of 
regional cooperation, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in trade, or the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) in finance. The final 
section concludes with some observations regarding the future prospects of rivalry 
between the two countries on regional cooperation.   
 
 
2. Irreconcilable Rivalry: Meta-level Institutionalization  
 
The negotiations for institution building have two stages. The first one is the 
negotiation preparation stage, which starts with the formation of a group of countries 
that share the value of establishing an institution and ends with the launch of 
negotiations on the substance of the institutions to be established. During the 
preparation stage, a loosely formed group of states starts to institutionalize its modality 
of decision-making rules and norms. The second stage is the actual negotiation stage, 
which starts with the launch of negotiations and ends with the conclusion of 
negotiations, to be followed by the establishment of the institution. This is the stage 
when negotiations are actually conducted to agree upon the details of the institution to 
be established.   
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Existing studies do not make a clear distinction between the negotiation 
preparation stage and the actual negotiation stage. At best, they regard the preparation 
stage as a tiny or insubstantial part of the whole negotiation process. As a result, they 
tend to oversimplify negotiations and overlook critical negotiation dynamics that can be 
observed at the outset of the entire negotiation process. First, it is often assumed that 
negotiations are conducted in an anarchical setting, and the fact that even negotiations 
for new institution building have some institutional context is overlooked. Liberal 
leadership literature argues that leadership is necessary to overcome so-called prisoners’ 
dilemma situations or collective action problems in an anarchical world that impedes 
the supply of international public goods, namely institutions.2 Second, it is assumed 
that negotiation takes place suddenly and that everything is negotiated at once through 
issue linkages. It is considered that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. These 
assumptions are not particularly problematic in analyzing hegemonic institutions 
because the hegemon in any case dominates the negotiations at both the meta- and 
non-meta-levels. However, an attempt to establish regional institutions by 
non-hegemons involves a more nuanced politics. 
 
Real negotiations, especially during the negotiation preparation stage, are a highly 
dynamic process, caused mainly by two factors associated with the problems discussed 
above. First, negotiations usually start at the meta-level and do not concern substance. 
The main task to be accomplished during the negotiation preparation stage is to conduct 
“negotiations to launch negotiations.” The modality of negotiations should be 
negotiated and agreed upon or at least shared among the concerned parties before the 
launch of actual negotiations on substance. Second, negotiations usually have some 
institutional context, even when it looks like negotiations for a newly proposed 
institution started from scratch.3 Countries spend a huge amount of resources so that 
favorable rules during the actual negotiation stage can be institutionalized during the 
preparation stage. Because countries attempt to institutionalize convenient negotiation 
modalities, no negotiation can take place in a vacuum.  
 
The rivalry among countries that aspire to leadership culminates during the 
negotiation preparation stage, not the actual negotiation stage, because the rules are 
institutionalized during the preparation stage. It is often the case that the launch of 
actual negotiations is delayed because countries are unable to agree upon the negotiation 
modalities to be institutionalized. Once negotiations are launched, the game is nearly 
over. Hence, the meta-level rivalry in institutionalizing negotiation modalities during 
the preparation stage tends to be irreconcilable.  
 
There are at least three meta-level modalities of negotiations to be institutionalized 
during the negotiation preparation stage. The first concerns membership. The issue of 
which countries can and cannot participate in the negotiations is critical; it has to be 
decided who is inside and who is outside the group of “like-minded” countries. There is 
a strong incentive for exclusion, rather than inclusion, because the exclusion of rivals is 
                                                   
2 In this vein, Young (1991) argues that there are three types of source for leadership: material resources (structural 
leadership), intellectual capacity (intellectual leadership), and entrepreneurship (entrepreneur leadership).  
3 Lukes (1974) argues that leadership often requires institutional context, rather than being made on an ad hoc basis.  
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necessary to assume leadership during negotiations in the group. Second, agenda setting 
is important, particularly the suppression of collective decisions (so-called 
non-decisions). Concerned parties should share some ideas regarding both what can and 
cannot be negotiated. Agenda items to be prioritized are often referred to as built-in 
agenda, while items to be dropped from negotiations are treated as fait accompli. A 
framework agreement and memorandum of understanding (MOU) are often used to 
confirm what has become no longer negotiable. Third, the sponsorship of a group or 
negotiations significantly affect the influence in the group’s decision making at an early 
stage of negotiations. Issues relating with sponsorship, including which country 
proposes a new institution, which country is the founder, which country chairs the 
meeting, and which country (location) hosts the organization or secretariat, affects the 
decision-making norms of the group.  
 
 
3. Regional FTAs 
 
3.1. Chinese Approach to Regional FTAs: EAFTA 
 
China seems already to have had the capacity to conduct proactive regional trade 
diplomacy by the late 1990s, but the situation was complicated because of the 
interaction between its regional trade diplomacy and its World Trade Organization 
(WTO) membership application. China applied for WTO membership in July 1986, but 
the process was a very long and difficult one. China’s regional trade diplomacy was 
nearly absent until it secured the WTO membership. This is because the pursuit of FTAs 
at a critical juncture of the WTO accession process would only make the prospect of its 
WTO membership slim. China and the United States bilaterally agreed upon the terms 
of WTO accession in November 1999, but it was only in September 2000 that the US 
Congress agreed to render Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR), namely, 
most-favored-nation (MFN) status, to China. Then-president Bill Clinton signed the bill 
for the Chinese PNTR in the following month. This meant that Chinese membership of 
the WTO was secured by then as far as US-China relations were concerned.  
 
The idea of a China-ASEAN FTA was informally floated by China around 1998, 
partly to cope with the “China threat” sentiment in ASEAN (Aslam 2012). China 
became very serious about realizing this ambitious project soon after it secured WTO 
membership in 2000, despite the fact that the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) formed in 
December 1998 was discussing East Asia–wide cooperation, including an East Asia 
Free Trade Area (EAFTA).4 China aggressively lobbied its ASEAN counterparts during 
ASEAN-related meetings held in late November 2000. The ASEAN side, however, 
regarded it as necessary to keep the same distance from China and Japan. In fact, at the 
ASEAN+3 Summit on 24 November, Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai expressed the 
view that an FTA that involved not only China but also Japan and Korea was desirable. 
Partly because Goh Chok Tong, the Singaporean Prime Minister, successfully guided 
the discussions among the ASEAN+3, the leaders agreed to establish an East Asia Study 
Group (EASG), consisting of government officials, and to include EAFTA as one of the 
                                                   
4 EAVG produced a report in which it recommended the establishment of an EAFTA. The report was submitted to 
the ASEAN+3 Summit in Brunei in 2001. 
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group’s study items (Hamanaka 2008). China, however, strongly demanded the 
initiation of a feasibility study on an ASEAN-China FTA at the ASEAN-China Summit 
held the next day. As a result, the Statement of the ASEAN Informal Summit, released 
on 25 November 2000, emphasized the significance of East Asian cooperation while 
also spelling out the initiation of a study on an ASEAN-China FTA. 5  At the 
ASEAN-China Summit in November 2001 in Brunei Darussalam, China and ASEAN 
agreed to establish an FTA in ten years’ time. In November 2002, the ASEAN-China 
Summit delivered a Framework Agreement on an ASEAN-China FTA while the 
ASEAN+3 Summit, held back-to-back with it, simply requested that their economic 
ministers study options for an EAFTA.6 By November 2004, China and ASEAN had 
already signed the Agreement on Trade in Goods of an ASEAN-China FTA. To 
summarize, ASEAN was unable to refuse the strong request from China, and the project 
of an ASEAN-China FTA moved very quickly, while the progress of EAFTA 
discussions was slow.7  
 
At the ASEAN+3 Summit in November 2004, leaders exchanged views on the 
establishment of EAFTA, and they welcomed the decision by the ASEAN+3 economic 
ministers to set up an expert group to conduct the feasibility study for EAFTA. The first 
meeting of the Joint Expert Group for a Feasibility Study on EAFTA (JEG) was held in 
April 2005 in Beijing, meaning that China was leading the project. China’s idea was to 
establish a goods-centric FTA among ASEAN+3 members alone (Teh 2011). The 
Chinese emphasis on trade in goods was natural given the fact that the service and 
investment components of the ASEAN-China FTA were still under negotiations as of 
2005.8  
 
One may wonder why China’s position with regard to an EAFTA that included 
Japan suddenly changed. As we saw, in 2000, China made every effort to facilitate the 
establishment of an ASEAN-China FTA excluding Japan, yet by 2005, China was 
already insisting upon the creation of an EAFTA that included Japan. One critical reason 
is that China’s trade expanded rapidly during this period and overtook that of Japan. In 
fact, as Figure 1 shows, Chinese trade grew much faster than Japan’s, and the total trade 
of China and Japan were almost the same in 2003. Whereas Chinese trade was 55% of 
that of Japan in 2000, it had become 30% more than that of Japan in 2005. By the 
mid-2000s, China was confident of assuming the leadership in negotiations for an FTA 
that covered the whole of Asia, provided that it was a goods-centric agreement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
5 http://asean.org/?static_post=the-fourth-asean-informal-summit-22-25-november-2000-singapore  
6 
http://asean.org/?static_post=press-statement-by-the-chairman-of-the-8th-asean-summit-the-6th-asean-3-summit-and-
the-asean-china-summit-phnom-penh-cambodia-4-november-2002-3  
7 In 2003, the statement for the ASEAN+3 Summit was merged with that of the ASEAN Summit. The statement for 
the ASEAN and ASEAN+3 Summit does not specifically mention the EAFTA.   
8 The Trade in Services Agreement and Agreement on Investment for ASEAN-China FTA were signed in 2007 and 
2009, respectively.  
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Figure 1: Total Trade of China and Japan 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on UNCTAD STAT 
 
 
China was not all that keen to support the idea of a Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) proposed by Japan in 2006 (see next section for the 
Japanese motivations for proposing CEPEA). Unlike EAFTA, CEPEA emphasized the 
significance of trade in services and investment. These were the areas where Japan was 
competitive via-a-vis China and had large commercial interests. Moreover, China had a 
very clear policy about the membership of a regional FTA—CEPEA was problematic 
because it included members beyond the ASEAN+3 (Teh 2011).9 The Chinese proposal 
on EAFTA and the Japanese proposal on CEPEA competed; feasibility studies for the 
two proposals were conducted separately, one led by China and the other led by Japan. 
While ASEAN made a desperate effort to bridge the two proposals in 2010, such an 
attempt was unsuccessful because the two countries stuck to their own initiatives 
(Hamanaka 2014).10  
 
However, in August 2011, both China and Japan suddenly announced a joint 
statement on East Asia cooperation and proposed the establishment of working groups 
in which both EAFTA and CEPEA could be discussed among the 16 members. This 
basically meant that China had become receptive to the Japanese idea of “wider” trade 
cooperation in terms of both issue areas and membership. The working groups were 
established to discuss three issues: (trade in goods, trade in services, and investment); 
China accepted the inclusion of trade in services and investment in the prospective 
region-wide FTA. Moreover, participation in the working groups included not only 
ASEAN+3 countries but also Australia, New Zealand, and India, which made the 
inclusion of those countries in the final agreement very likely. In November 2011, 
ASEAN agreed to support the joint proposal made by China and Japan and to establish 
working groups to conduct preparatory work for the negotiations for the prospective 
region-wide agreement, which was given a new name, the RCEP. Hence, we can say 
                                                   
9 CEPEA included Australia, New Zealand, and India in addition to the ASEAN+3 countries.  
10 In 2010, ASEAN established working groups on the rules of origin, tariffs, customs procedures, and economic 
cooperation. The participants in these working groups were the ASEAN+6 countries. From the Japanese perspective, 
the ASEAN proposal was too goods-centric. For China, its membership was too wide.  
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that by 2010, China had agreed to negotiate a region-wide FTA covering not only goods 
but also services and investment that was very similar to the CEPEA originally 
proposed by Japan.11  
 
How to explain such a rapid shift in Chinese regional economic diplomacy, 
especially its positive attitude toward the investment negotiations? There are two main 
reasons. First, there was the possibility that regional trade diplomacy in Asia might be 
dominated by the US-led TPP. In fact, Japanese Prime Minister Kan expressed interest 
for the first time in Japanese membership of TPP at the Diet Session in October 2010. 
China did not want to see regional trade diplomacy dominated by a TPP that was jointly 
led by the United States and Japan. It was necessary for China to attract Japan so that its 
region-wide FTA project became successful. The second main reason was the rise of 
China. As Figure 2 shows, the rise of China in the investment field was highly 
significant after 2005. In particular, having a large amount of outward investment was 
critical to having a large voice in investment agreement negotiations because many 
countries were trying to attract investment. While investment flows fluctuate across 
years, Chinese outward investment grew very quickly, especially after 2005. It is highly 
symbolic that Chinese outward investment surpassed that of Japan for the first time in 
2010. In short, while China was not confident of negotiating investment with Japan in 
2005, such a situation had totally changed by 2010.  
 
 
Figure 2: Outward Investment of China and Japan 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on UNCTAD STAT.   
 
 
From around 2010, from the Chinese perspective, the only condition that any 
region-wide agreement had to satisfy was that the United States be excluded from it. 
Given US absence, China could dominate regional trade negotiations even if they 
included Japan. In November 2012, ASEAN and its FTA partners formally agreed to 
launch RCEP negotiations, and the Guiding Principle and Objectives for Negotiating the 
RCEP was announced. Principle 6 of the Guiding Principles states that only ASEAN 
                                                   
11 The RCEP negotiations were formally launched in November 2012. 
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FTA partners can join the RCEP negotiations. Note that the United States does not have 
an FTA with ASEAN as a group; hence, it cannot be a part of the RCEP negotiations.  
 
3.2. Japanese Approach to Regional FTAs: From CEPEA to TPP  
 
For a long time, Japan had not been interested in trade regionalism, for two main 
reasons. First, protection of the agricultural sector was critically important for 
politicians to secure their seat in the Diet (Pempel and Urata 2013). Because tariffs 
would have to be eliminated for practically all trade, including agricultural products, the 
signing of FTAs was difficult for Japan. Second, economic multilateralism, rather than 
regionalism or bilateralism, was in Japan’s interest (Manger 2005). Japan always 
considered the WTO system to be critically important and the signing of FTAs would 
ruin the WTO system. Moreover, investment multilateralism, that is, the establishment 
of multilateral regimes for investment, which is not fully covered by the WTO, had been 
one of Japan’s critical agendas. In fact, Japan was a strong proponent of the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI), which was negotiated at the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the 1990s.  
 
Japan’s pursuit of regionalism and bilateralism started in the field of investment, 
rather than trade. As Japan started to have huge amounts of investment assets abroad, 
both investment protection and liberalization had become immediate problems by the 
late 1990s, especially after the MAI became unlikely. Japan launched negotiations for a 
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with Korea12 in November 1998, immediately after 
the collapse of MAI negotiations. Japan also agreed to start BIT negotiations with 
Vietnam in March 1999. These pre-dated the launch of Japan’s first FTA negotiation 
with Singapore; the two countries agreed to start negotiations only in January 2001. 
Hence, we can say that Japan’s investment bilateralism started even before its trade 
bilateralism (Hamanaka 2017).  
 
Japan’s regional trade diplomacy responded quickly to the Chinese proposal for an 
FTA with ASEAN made in November 2000. In January 2001, Japan and Singapore 
agreed to launch bilateral negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). 
After the agreement was made to launch ASEAN-China FTA negotiations in November 
2001, Japan’s regional trade diplomacy became even more proactive (Hamanaka 2008). 
In January 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi visited Singapore and proposed the 
establishment of an EPA between Japan and ASEAN. Unlike the Chinese proposal, 
which was an FTA (goods-centric), the Japanese proposal was intended to be 
comprehensive, covering trade in services, investment, and intellectual property and 
applying to both Japan-Singapore and Japan-ASEAN agreements. 
 
Japan was concerned that the negotiations for EAFTA would be dominated by 
China. It therefore made a counter-proposal on CEPEA in 2006 (Teh 2011). Emphasis 
was placed on CEPEA’s comprehensiveness, going beyond traditional goods trade, the 
                                                   
12 Until 2001, Japan signed only nine BITs. The first one was with Egypt signed in 1977. For almost all Japanese 
BITs signed in early days, the partner side approached Japan expecting BITs are helpful in attracting Japanese 
investment. Those BITs are classified as the first generation of Japanese BITs – they cover only investment protection, 
not liberalization. In contrast, Japan-Korea BIT cover both investment protection ne liberalization. See Hamanaka 
(2017).  
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focus of EAFTA. Trade in services, investment, and intertextual property were the core 
components of the Japanese proposal. Japan’s idea was that it could dominate the 
discussions even in regional negotiations that included China if the core issue areas 
were services and investment. With regard to membership, CEPEA included not only 
ASEAN+3 but also Australia, New Zealand, and India. Japan considered that the 
involvement of Australia, New Zealand, and India would contribute to its bargaining 
power vis-à-vis China. Moreover, it seems that the CEPEA did not rule out the 
possibility of US participation in future, provided that it joined the East Asia Summit. 
The first experts’ meeting for CEPEA was held in Tokyo in June 2007. Japan sped up 
the study so that it would not fall behind the EAFTA study led by China. The CEPEA 
study was finalized in July 2009, only one month after the completion of the study on 
EAFTA. While the results of EAFTA study were reported to the ASEAN+3 Economic 
Ministers Meeting (EMM) in August 2009, those of CEPEA were reported to the EMM 
of the ASEAN+6, meetings that were held back-to-back with each other.  
 
In August 2011, Japan and China agreed to establish working groups in which both 
EAFTA and CEPEA could be discussed. This movement implies that China accepted 
CEPEA, as already discussed, although the prospective agreement received a new 
name: RCEP. However, this did not lead to a situation in which the Japanese could 
achieve their original goal of realizing CEPEA using the platform of RCEP. Rather, by 
2011, Japan had become very cautious about CEPEA/RCEP, wary that it could lead to 
the creation of a regional FTA dominated by China. This is ironic because Japan was 
keen to establish CEPEA when China was reluctant, and became disinterested in its own 
proposal when China became receptive to it. It is perhaps more accurate to argue that 
Japan became cautious about CEPEA because China became receptive to it. This clearly 
shows that who leads and dominates is critical to understanding Asian trade diplomacy 
(Teh 2011, 353; Hamanaka 2014).  
 
Why, then, did Japan agree to make an announcement on East Asian cooperation 
with China that resulted in the creation of the three working groups, despite the fact that 
it had started to fear any regional trade agreements that were likely to be dominated by 
China? The essential reason for Japan agreeing to launch RCEP was that Japan wanted 
to obtain a “China card” in order to make its TPP negotiations easier (Hamanaka 2014). 
Japan and China agreed to establish working groups in August 2011, but three months 
later, in November 2011, at Honolulu, where the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) leaders was being held, Japan formally expressed interest in 
participating in the TPP negotiations. While Mexico and Canada expressed interest at 
the same time as Japan, and their applications were approved in June 2012, approval for 
Japan’s participation was delayed, which frustrated Japan. On 20 November 2012, 
Japanese Prime Minister Noda met US President Obama and requested that the US 
support Japan’s participation in TPP; on exactly the same day, the RCEP negotiations 
were formally launched. The Japanese message was very clear: “If you (the United 
States) do not treat us (Japan) in a friendly manner, there is a possibility that we will go 
to the Chinese camp.” Partly because of the China card, Japan’s participation in TPP 
negotiations was finally approved in March 2013.  
 
After Japan secured a seat at the TPP negotiating table, it concentrated its 
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negotiating resources on TPP negotiations. Once TPP was concluded, Japan started to 
think that China should join TPP and accept the rules crafted by TPP members and did 
not seem to be keen to facilitate RCEP negotiations any longer.  
 
 
4. Regional Financial Institutions   
 
4.1. Japanese Approach to Regional Financial Cooperation: ADB and AMF 
 
Since the end of World War II, Japan has been a strong proponent of Asia-only 
financial cooperation. While it is true that Japan supported US international financial 
hegemony, namely, the Bretton Woods system, it had a strong desire to lead Asian 
financial cooperation, excluding the United States. It is entirely wrong to argue that 
Japan was an obedient follower of the United States as far as regional finance is 
concerned (Hamanaka 2011a, b).  
 
The ADB, established in 1966, included the United States, but we should not 
overlook the fact that it was treated as a non-regional member. One cannot simply argue 
that the United States’ non-regional membership was natural because it was not an 
Asian country. The regional development bank responsible for regional development in 
Latin America is called the Inter-American Development Bank (not the Latin American 
Development Bank), which included the United States as a regional member; its head 
office is in Washington, DC. Hence, it is not surprising that an Asia-Pacific 
Development Bank that included the United States as a regional member was 
established in the 1960s. The point here is that Japan successfully excluded the United 
States from the ADB’s regional membership while securing its financial contributions. 
In short, the ADB was a Japanese arrangement with a large US financial contribution 
and little US involvement in management, according to Huang (1975). The United 
States was not keen to support the Japan-led ADB project but reluctantly decided not to 
object because it feared that opposition to the proposal would simply fuel anti-US 
sentiment in Asia caused by its bombing in the Vietnam War (White 1970). At the same 
time, we should remember that the United States made every effort to have the ADB 
headquarters located in Manila, not Tokyo. Indeed, Manila was chosen, but as a result of 
voting (Yasutomo 1983).  
 
In February 1991, the first Executives Meeting of the East Asian and Pacific 
Central Banks (EMEAP) was held in Tokyo. EMEAP is a regional central bank forum, 
established by Bank of Japan (BOJ), which can be regarded as the Asian version of the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). It should be noted that the EMEAP project 
began even before Mahathir floated the idea of an East Asia Economic Group (EAEG), 
which later came to be known as the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC). While some 
argue that the EAEG/EAEC triggered regionalism in East Asia, which eventually led to 
ASEAN+3 (Terada 2003), such an argument tells us only a part of the story. In the 
finance field, Asianism existed even before the EAEG/EAEC. EMEAP is not an 
exception in this regard. The United States was excluded from EMEAP, and despite the 
US Central Bank (Federal Research Board) strongly requesting membership, the BOJ 
has refused to accept its request (Yokoi-Arai 2002). What is also very interesting is that 
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China is also excluded from the original membership, although it joined in 1992, unlike 
the United States. BOJ officials may be able to provide several plausible excuses why 
China was not ready to be a part of EMEAP in 1991, but none of them seems to be 
sufficiently convincing because China obtained EMEAP membership only one year 
later, and all the more so given that APEC accepted Chinese membership in 1991. A 
more convincing argument is that the BOJ excluded China from the original 
membership of EMEAP, whereas there was a growing trend of “engaging China” in the 
early 1990s. The absence of China for one year was critical to realizing an EMEAP 
dominated by Japan (Hamanaka 2010, 101).  
 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) attempted to establish the Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF) soon after the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The United States 
was not included in the prospective membership of the AMF. The Japanese proposal for 
AMF membership included only the contributors to the Thai rescue package agreed at 
the Thai rescue meeting organized in Tokyo in August 1997. It can be said that Japan 
took advantage of the fact that the United States did not contribute to the Thai package 
to justify the US exclusion from the AMF.13 The United States did not support the AMF 
on the grounds that it undermined the function of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (Blustein 2001). However, the real reason why the United States blocked the 
proposal was that AMF excluded the United States from membership. In fact, Fred 
Bergstein, who was the president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics 
(PIIE) and a close aide to the Clinton Administration, argued that the establishment of 
an Asia-Pacific Monetary Fund that included the United States was desirable (Bergsten 
1998).  
 
While the AMF was not established, Asian countries agreed to create the Chiang 
Mai Initiative (CMI) in May 2000, and the United States was unable to make an 
objection to it. The CMI is a network of swap arrangements among financial authorities 
in East Asia. This was a virtual AMF, because countries hit by crises could borrow 
money from regional partners, although there was no formal organizational structure 
attached to the CMI, unlike AMF. While the United States was not a part of the CMI, 
there was one important rider: only 10% of CMI money could be disbursed without the 
approval of IMF. In other words, when members disbursed more than 10% of CMI 
money, the approval of IMF, where the United States has the dominant voice, was 
necessary. Hence, the CMI features Asian money that virtually requires US approval for 
disbursement. Japan, of course, was unhappy with such an arrangement, and its strategy 
was to reduce US influence by increasing the total amount of the fund and the delinked 
portion of CMI money from the IMF.14  
 
After 2005, Japan was no longer the single dominant player in Asia in the field of 
international finance. As Figure 3 shows, the foreign reserves of China and Japan were 
already comparable in 2005. At the same time, China was not confident enough to 
assume leadership in international or regional finance, partly because of the global 
financial crisis that culminated in the Lehman shock in 2008. What is very interesting is 
that China and Japan agreed to accept “equal footing” in Asian financial arrangements 
                                                   
13 The United States participated in the Thai rescue meeting but refused to contribute financially to the package.  
14 The delinked share was increased to 20% in 2009 and to 30% in 2014.  
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when their financial power was comparable. The CMI was multilateralized and started 
to introduce a voting mechanism in March 2010. The two parties agreed to hold the 
same voting power in the multilateralized CMI. In May 2010, China and Japan agreed 
to the basic modality of the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), a 
kind of secretariat for surveillance under the multilateralized CMI.15 The AMRO Office 
is located neither in Tokyo nor Beijing but in a third country, Singapore. The head 
position of AMRO rotates between China and Japan.16   
 
 
Figure 3: Foreign Reserves of China and Japan 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on IMF data.   
 
 
Japan became very cautious about an Asia-only financial arrangement after 2011. 
From the beginning, Japan was not supportive of the AIIB proposed by China in 2013. 
While some may argue that Japan is following the United States with regard to its 
position on the AIIB, in my view, the reality is that it is Japan, not the United States, that 
fundamentally dislikes the AIIB. Any debate on the AIIB always relates to the ADB. 
The Japanese executives, officials, and media always see the AIIB in comparison with 
the ADB. The implied question expressed by any opinion leader is “Why do we need 
the AIIB given the fact that there is the ADB, established by Japan half a century ago?” 
It is true that there are some co-financing projects between the ADB and the AIIB, but 
we should not overlook the fact that all of them are ADB projects co-financed by the 
AIIB. There is no AIIB project co-financed by the ADB.  
 
4.2. Chinese Approach to Regional Financial Cooperation: AIIB  
 
Beijing was not part of the ADB when it was established. Taipei represented China. 
Beijing joined the ADB as a latecomer in 1986, and Taipei continued to stay in the ADB. 
The ADB is one of the few international organizations of which both Beijing and Taipei 
                                                   
15 AMRO was established in April 2011.  
16 The three-year term of the inaugural president was split into the first year and the subsequent two years because 
the countries were unable to agree which was to have the inaugural president. 
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have membership. It was inevitable that China (Beijing) should join the ADB in 1986 
because it was by then an institution in existence for two decades. The options that 
China had were limited to whether or not to join it. The situation of the Chinese 
membership of EMEAP is similar to that of its ADB membership. Because EMEAP was 
established in secret in 1991 (EMEAP 2003), perhaps without Beijing even noticing, 
Beijing was inevitably a latecomer. Beijing decided to join as a latecomer because it did 
not like to see the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) join EMEAP before it. In 
short, because the ADB and EMEAP already existed, all China could do was join them 
before problematic competitors (such as Taiwan and Hong Kong) joined.  
 
When Japan proposed the AMF in 1997, all Asian countries supported the Japanese 
idea, with the notable exception of China. It is noteworthy that the Chinese position on 
the AMF proposal was very similar to that of the United States: Japanese-led regional 
financial cooperation in Asia was undesirable. China did not speak at all at the meeting 
to discuss the establishment of the AMF held in Hong Kong in September 1997, despite 
Korea and ASEAN members supporting the Japanese idea. Japanese MOF officials 
involved in AMF negotiations recall that China did not support the AMF proposal 
because silence means objection in international meetings (Blustein 2001, 167).  
 
As has been discussed, the critical question regarding the institutional design of the 
CMI established in May 2000 was its IMF linkage. Japan wanted an independent CMI 
in which money could be disbursed without IMF approval. The United States insisted 
upon a high IMF linkage. A compromise was made to set the portion of IMF linkage at 
90% (only 10% can be disbursed without IMF approval). What, then, was the Chinese 
position on this critical question? China’s position was that the CMI should be fully 
linked to the IMF, meaning a 100% linkage of CMI money to IMF conditionality 
(Amyx 2004). In other words, China was of the view that the IMF and the United States 
should be fully involved in CMI decision making via the IMF linkage. Because China 
did not want a CMI dominated by Japan to be established, it chose a CMI dominated by 
the United States/IMF, which was “the second-worst scenario.”  
 
China announced its proposal on the AIIB in October 2013. During the ADB 
annual meeting in May 2014, China arranged a dinner meeting and invited 16 countries 
to discuss the AIIB; the United States and Japan were not invited. In October 2014, an 
MOU for the AIIB was signed by 21 countries in which a headquarters in Beijing was 
mentioned. We can say that China learned from the mistake committed by Japan during 
the ADB establishment process. Because the location of ADB headquarters had been 
decided by voting, Japan failed to secure it. China’s strategy was that the MOU, which 
stipulates the location of the headquarters as Beijing, should be signed quickly by the 
invited guests to avoid any complicated negotiations.   
 
China set the deadline of expressing an interest in AIIB membership as March 
2015. While more than 50 countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Korea, and Australia, expressed an interest, Japan and the United States did not. Any 
country that wanted to participate in negotiations, including Japan and the United States, 
had to submit an application to Beijing. Japan and the United States were of the view 
that the lack of transparency in AIIB governance made it difficult for them to join. It is 
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possible to argue that China took advantage of such statements made by Japan and the 
United States—as long as transparency was not guaranteed, the United States and Japan 
would not ask to join. In the AIIB, there are two types of distinction in terms of 
membership: (i) between regional and non-regional members and (ii) between original 
members and latecomers. Because neither Japan nor the United States qualified as 
regional and original members, China was the legitimate leader of the AIIB as far as its 
membership rules were concerned, because it is from Asia and one of its original 
member.17   
 
 
5. Conclusion: Is China-Japan Cooperation Possible?  
 
In general, we have confirmed that Sino-Japanese rivalry over the meta-level 
institutionalization of negotiation modalities have been intense. The launch of 
negotiations that comfortably involve both China and Japan is extremely difficult to 
produce. The meta-level power struggle concentrates on three negotiation modalities: 
membership (who should participate in the negotiations); prior agenda setting (what 
should be discussed in the negotiations); and sponsorship (who can claim the credit; 
who chairs the negotiations). Each country expends a huge amount of resources in order 
to launch negotiations favorable to itself. The launch of negotiations sometimes 
becomes very difficult because of the intense struggle preceding it. 
 
The behavior patterns of the two countries are very similar. First, on membership, 
both try to assume leadership by excluding the other, as well as the United States. 
Holding the predominant leadership position in regional projects that exclude the United 
States is the best scenario for both China and Japan. The worst scenario for each is the 
leadership assumed by the other under conditions of regionalism that excludes the 
United States. Each country often objects to the other’s regionalism projects. As a result, 
these projects tend to exclude not only the United States, but also the other country. 
Regionalism that includes the United States, in which it naturally assumes leadership, is 
an option that lies between the two extreme scenarios—it can be the second-best or the 
second-worst scenario, depending on the context. For China, the Japan-led AMF and 
Japan-led CEPEA were the worst scenarios. Hence, it sometimes opted for the 
second-worst potion, namely, US-led regionalism. Indeed, China attempted to include 
the United States in the CMI via its IMF linkage. Likewise, for Japan, China-led 
projects such as RCEP are the worst scenario. Japan is supporting TPP, led by the 
United States. Similarly, in the field of finance, the AIIB is the worst scenario for Japan.  
 
Second, agenda setting is also important for the two countries. While the two 
countries proposed the FTA, the Chinese one was a goods agreement, whereas what 
Japan attempted to establish was, in essence, an investment agreement. The rivalry 
between the trade-centric EAFTA of 13 countries proposed by China and the 
investment-centric CEPEA of 16 countries proposed by Japan are one illustrative 
example.  
                                                   
17 If the United States and Japan had made a joint counter-proposal of an Asia-Pacific Infrastructure Investment Bank, 
located in Beijing but with a non-Chinese president in its early stage, the course of negotiations would have been 
totally different.  
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Third, sponsorship is critical. Perhaps the most intense rivalry can be observed in 
the claims over sponsorship of negotiations. The two countries try to chair meetings and 
host the secretariats or head offices. Moreover, it matters which country initially 
proposed a new institution; each country sticks to the projects it initiated and seldom 
supports a project sponsored by its rival, even if the contents are agreeable. China 
wanted to launch new negotiations for RCEP, even though the contents of RCEP were 
almost the same as those of CEPEA, because the latter was originally a Japanese 
proposal in which Japan naturally had a large voice. The fact that RCEP was regarded as 
a Chinese initiative simply reduced the Japanese appetite for it, even though the 
contents of RCEP and CEPEA were similar. While Japan thinks that the AIIB is 
redundant, simply duplicating the Japan-sponsored ADB, China wanted an institution 
sponsored by itself. The fact that China proposed the AIIB and hosted the negotiation 
meeting and the head office is important to China. These are exactly the reasons why 
Japan is indifferent to AIIB, though what China is doing is almost the same as what 
Japan did a half century ago.  
 
We can now have a relatively clear idea about what is likely to happen in the near 
future regarding Sino-Japanese rivalry in economic cooperation in Asia. In the field of 
finance, the worst scenario for Japan is for Japan to join the AIIB and the United States 
not to join, because this would result in Asia-only cooperation being dominated by 
China. The only scenario for Japanese participation in the AIIB is for it to join together 
with the United States. Here, the question is whether the United States can be a 
dominant player in AIIB. It may try to compete with China in the AIIB by requesting 
significant voting power and executive positions, such as vice president, but the 
important point here is that China has already won vis-à-vis the United States at the 
meta level. First, the United States and Japan are treated as non-original members. The 
agenda of the AIIB is already decided. Moreover, the AIIB is under Chinese sponsorship. 
If Chinese dominance is clear even after the participation of the United States and Japan, 
they are unlikely to join. In the field of trade, because Japan did not have the desire to 
lead the region by establishing an Asia-only FTA, it decided to join the TPP led by the 
United States, which is much better than participating in an RCEP dominated by China. 
While some argue that TPP and RCEP are the two wheels of trade liberalization in the 
Asia-Pacific, it is more likely that Japan will try to involve China in the TPP without 
concluding RCEP negotiations. At least, until the United States returns to the TPP, Japan 
will try to delay the conclusion of RCEP negotiations. For Japan, having a TPP that 
involves the United States is a necessary condition of finalizing RCEP negotiations. 
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